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The recent asylum crisis in Europe has rekindled the 
debate on so-called burden-sharing, also referred to 
as responsibility sharing. As in the past, this has been 
stimulated by the very uneven distribution of asylum 
applications across EU countries. In this contribution I 
briefly outline the recent trends in asylum applications 
and the discussion that this has generated. I subsequent-
ly make a case for joint action in asylum policy, based 
on the notion that refugee hosting can be viewed as a 
public good. Finally I consider policy developments up 
to and including the present refugee crisis. I suggest that 
greater progress could be made by shifting away from 
spontaneous asylum seeking towards a substantial joint 
programme for resettling refugees from countries of 
first asylum. 
Asylum applications and asylum policies
The last three decades have wit-
nessed an unprecedented number 
of people arriving in European 
countries or at their borders in 
order to apply for asylum. Over 
that period the average num-
ber of applications received in 
the EU has been nearly 400,000 
per year. Some individuals ar-
rived with visitor visas, but many 
gained unauthorised entry by 
land or sea. As Figure 1 shows, 
the figure has fluctuated over 
time. The sharp peak in the ear-
ly 1990s was associated with the 
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fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, which led to a surge in applications from the 
former communist countries, but also opened up tran-
sit routes for those from further afield. The early 2000s 
saw a rise in applications due to the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, as well as a rise in conflicts elsewhere in 
the world. By far the greatest surge, however, has been 
seen over the last few years. Events following the Arab 
Spring, and most importantly the war in Syria and Iraq, 
have led to a steep rise in applications, which reached 
1.3 million in 2015. Each of these peaks in asylum ap-
plications has prompted a wide-ranging policy debate in 
the EU, as well as a round of reforms.  
The foundation of asylum law is the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. This provides the definition of a refugee as 
a person who has a “well-founded fear of persecution” 
from a specified set of causes. Each claim must be judged 
on its individual merits and asylum applicants must not 
be returned to a situation where their life or freedom 
would be threatened. Unauthorised entry into a country 
does not prejudice the outcome of an asylum claim. So, 
in principle, there is no limit to the number that a desti-
nation country could receive. The Convention, however, 
is short on detail as to how applications are to be dealt 
with and there is considerable latitude for policies that 
deter or deflect potential asylum applicants. These can 
be divided into three types. First, there are policies that 
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limit or prevent access to a country’s territory, which is 
necessary to establish a claim to asylum. Second, there 
are degrees of toughness in assessing whether or not an 
applicant qualifies as a refugee or should be allowed to 
stay on other humanitarian grounds. And third, there 
are policies relating to the rights and conditions accord-
ed to asylum seekers during and after the assessment of 
their claims. 
Following the Amsterdam Treaty, effective as of 1999, 
competence in asylum policy was passed to the EU. 
In the development of the EU-led Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) the main objective was to 
harmonise the way in which asylum policies are im-
plemented by member states. Among the key measures 
were directives covering the criteria for granting asy-
lum (the Qualification Directive), the procedures used 
in adjudicating asylum claims (the Asylum Procedures 
Directive) and the rights and conditions afforded to asy-
lum seekers (the Reception Conditions Directive). These 
directives have been revised and upgraded in each of the 
three phases of the CEAS. And while they have led to a 
degree of convergence in policy, differences remain be-
tween countries in their implementation. One of the ear-
liest agreements was the so-called Dublin Regulation, 
which has also gone through several rounds of revision. 
In order to prevent ‘asylum shopping’, this agreement 
provides that an asylum application be dealt with by one 
member state, normally the first country of entry into 
the EU. Other measures include an integrated finger-
print database (EURODAC), cooperation over border 
controls with the establishment of FRONTEX, and roll-
ing out the biometric visa system (VIS) in the Schengen 
states. 
The CEAS has concentrated on harmonising rules 
and procedures with the aim of ensuring that an asy-
lum seeker receives approximately the same treatment 
in each member state. By contrast, much less empha-
sis has been placed on sharing out the burdens (or re-
sponsibilities) across member states. In the aftermath 
of the Kosovo crisis the EU established the European 
refugee fund now renamed the Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund (AMIF), which is a common financial 
pool to support refugee integration and provide resourc-
es to member states facing a mass influx of refugees. 
Shortly afterwards, the Temporary Protection Directive 
was introduced to relocate refugees from countries un-
der exceptional pressure in the event of a mass influx. 
But it lacked a formal triggering mechanism or a formu-
la for redistribution. Despite pressure from some coun-
tries (Italy, Malta, Greece), it has never been invoked 
and seems likely to be abolished. In 2010 the European 
Asylum Support Office was established in Malta with 
the aim of disseminating best-practice methods and 
supporting states facing exceptional asylum pressures. 
While the office is also expected to assist in the relo-
cation of recognised refugees, this is only on an agreed 
basis between member states and with the consent of the 
individuals concerned.
Burden-sharing would not be an issue if asylum appli-
cations were fairly evenly distributed across European 
countries. But they are not. As Figure 2 shows, total 
applications in the five years 2011–15 per 1000 of the 
host country population varied massively. While coun-
tries like Sweden, Hungary, Malta and Austria received 
a high level of applications, others in the Baltic and 
Iberian regions and some in Eastern Europe received 
comparatively few. Previous years would show a slight-
ly different country ranking, but a similar degree of 
inequality. One reason for these disparities is that asy-
lum-seeker preferences are clearly skewed towards 
some countries based on language and cultural affinity. 
This is often reflected by the size of the existing diaspo-
ra and the ‘pull’ effects that it generates. Another factor 
is ease of access to the territory, which is a particular 
issue for member states on the EU’s external border 
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and which is exacerbated by the operation of the Dublin 
Regulation. EU policy has done little to even out the ref-
ugee burden between countries. Indeed, by constrain-
ing countries facing the largest numbers of applications 
from implementing tougher policies of deterrence, it 
may have added to these imbalances. But recent events 
have raised the pressure to share this burden, a point that 
I will deal with later. 
A case for cooperation?
In democratic countries governments must pay heed to 
the will of their electors. Immigration policies are often 
framed in a way that serves the interests of host popula-
tions, either of specific individuals, as in the case of fam-
ily reunification, or of the wider economy, as in the case 
of skill-selective labour migration. But asylum is differ-
ent: refugees are admitted on the grounds of the benefit 
to them of escaping persecution, rather than on grounds 
of direct benefit to the host society or specific members 
of it. Such humanitarian motives are widespread in so-
ciety and those sentiments seem to be gaining ground. 
That means helping those that are persecuted, even if 
the economic cost outweighs the economic benefit. 
Hosting refugees can be interpreted as a public good 
(Hatton 2015). The satisfaction that one individual 
gets from knowing that refugees are given a safe haven 
does not diminish the satisfaction that accrues to other 
individuals from seeing the same refugees saved from 
persecution. Nor can any host-country person be de-
nied that satisfaction. Thus the benefit to host-country 
individuals is non-rival and non-excludable – the char-
acteristics of a public good. The same applies across 
countries. If one country accepts refugees, then the citi-
zens of another country benefit from the knowledge that 
those refugees have found safety. But the costs fall only 
on the country providing sanctuary. If each country sets 
its policy independently such as to balance the costs and 
benefits to its citizens, then it will fail to take account of 
the benefits flowing to the residents of other countries. 
In such a case the public good will be underprovided. 
A benevolent social planner would set policies that take 
the externality into account. In the present context that 
would be the EU. 
In a setting where the ‘demand’ for asylum places dif-
fers across countries, non-cooperative policies will also 
differ between countries. Those countries receiving a 
disproportionate number of claims will have tougher 
policies in order to deter enough applicants to get to the 
desired level. If the policies of different countries were 
to be set by the social planner, more refugees would be 
admitted, but policies would still differ between coun-
tries because they face different levels of demand. If, on 
the other hand, a central authority were to impose the 
same policy on all countries then, relative to the social 
optimum, some could have too many refugees and some 
would have too few. Thus the social optimum would not 
be reached. 
If, as in the CEAS, policy seeks to set common stand-
ards for border control, for the adjudication of asylum 
claims, and for the reception conditions that asylum 
seekers face, then some other mechanism must be found 
in order to reach the social optimum for each country. 
One possibility is to establish a common fund in order 
to compensate, with a subsidy, those countries hosting 
a disproportionate number of refugees. This is essen-
tially what the AMIF does, although the scale of such 
transfers, even in the newly beefed-up version, seems 
inadequate compensation. An alternative is to first set a 
policy to obtain what would be the optimal number for 
all countries taken together, and then to reallocate them 
to get the ‘right’ number for each country. 
This vision of asylum policy has its flaws. One is that 
it is hard to determine what the overall number of ref-
ugees should be, not least because that would require 
some knowledge of the value of the externality. Another 
is the difficulty of reaching agreement in the absence of 
an all-powerful social planner, when individual coun-
tries have an incentive to free-ride (Facchini, Lorz and 
Willmann 2006). Related to that, how can the differenc-
es between countries in preferences for providing hu-
manitarian assistance be taken into account? One pos-
sibility would be to introduce a quota trading scheme, 
along the lines of emissions trading schemes. The pref-
erences of applicants for destination countries and the 
preferences of countries for certain types of applicants 
could be equilibrated by an appropriate matching mech-
anism (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport 2015). 
But nevertheless, the uncontrolled arrival of widely 
fluctuating numbers in different countries is likely to 
present practical problems, as explored in greater detail 
below. 
Recent events and possible reforms
As with other elements of asylum policy, political de-
bate over burden-sharing has ebbed and flowed. In the 
mid-1990s a proposal from Germany to distribute in-
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dividuals coming from the east fell on deaf ears. The 
debate was resurrected a decade later, by which time the 
issue had fallen under the purview of the EU. Several 
options were examined that proposed a distribution key, 
which would reflect the refugee-hosting capacity of dif-
ferent EU member states, and as a result, what propor-
tion of all asylum claims would need to be transferred 
from one country to another. Depending on the measure 
of refugee-hosting capacity used, and the benchmark 
year chosen, the equalising share of asylum applications 
transferred between countries could be between 11 and 
40 percent of the EU total (see Hatton 2015, 618). But the 
idea of implementing a redistribution scheme failed to 
gain traction at that time, only to be revived again by the 
recent migration crisis. 
As the Syrian crisis unfolded, with a rising number of 
people crossing the Mediterranean and the Aegean in 
the hope of gaining asylum, the pressure for redistri-
bution returned. In March 2015 the EU issued a draft 
distribution key; and in August 2015 an ‘agreement’ 
was reached to redistribute a total of 160,000 asylum ap-
plicants from Italy and Greece to other member states. 
It met with considerable resistance, particularly from 
countries in Eastern Europe. The Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán led the outcry, commenting 
on state radio that: “This is not solidarity. It is an un-
fair, unrighteous proposal which we cannot accept…. 
It is a crazy idea for someone to let refugees into their 
own country, not defend their own borders, and then 
say: ‘Now I will distribute them among you, who did 
not want to let anyone in.’” (Associated Press 5/8/15).2 
Partly as a result of this resistance, even a year later, 
only about 3,000 have been transferred. 
Recent experience suggests that burden-sharing in the 
form of redistribution of asylum applicants is doomed 
to failure. But the theory described above suggests that 
there would be some optimum number for the EU as a 
whole; and it seems likely that this has been far exceed-
ed by the surge of migrants seeking asylum in 2015. It is 
not surprising, then, that some countries facing a steep 
upsurge in their own asylum applications would resist 
taking more from other countries. In 2015 Hungary re-
ceived 174,000 asylum applications – over four times 
the average of the previous year and 13 times the aver-
age over the five years 2010–14. Orbán’s comment also 
points to failures of border controls in some member 
states as a divisive issue. What this suggests is not that 
2  In the Hungarian referendum of 2nd October 2016 on whether or not 
to reject the EU distribution scheme, an overwhelming majority voted 
to reject. But it was boycotted by opposition parties and rendered inva-
lid by the low turnout. 
the quest for a more even distribution must be aban-
doned forever, but that the scale of the recent asylum 
crisis has made agreement on distribution all the more 
difficult. 
It might be argued that, even if (some) governments, 
wishing to be seen on the world stage as upholding hu-
manitarian values, were willing to expand their asylum 
seeker admissions, those that elect them are not. Yet the 
evidence from the European Social Survey indicates 
that the populations of most countries have become 
more favourable to refugees. The 18-country average 
share of respondents disagreeing with the statement 
“the government should be generous in judging peo-
ple’s applications for refugee status” declined by 14.7 
percentage points between 2002 and 2014 (Hatton 2016, 
Table 8). However, European citizens are overwhelm-
ingly opposed to illegal immigration and, for that reason 
alone, the migration crisis that in 2015 witnessed 1.82 
million unauthorised crossings into the EU seems to 
have soured opinion. The fact that over half of asylum 
applicants fail to gain some form of humanitarian recog-
nition only serves to strengthen that sentiment (Hatton 
2016). 
One alternative would be to shift away from the exist-
ing system of spontaneous asylum seeking in which mi-
grants embark on risky passages in order to gain access 
to an uncertain prospect of getting asylum. That would 
involve eliminating, or radically reducing, the incen-
tive for unauthorised entry into the EU, something that 
is already occurring. The agreement on 18 March 2016 
between the EU and Turkey that allowed unrecognised 
migrants to be returned in exchange for recognised ref-
ugees has been effective in reducing unauthorised mari-
time arrivals to a small fraction of previous year’s num-
bers. But tough border controls, if implemented on all 
the major migration routes, would deny access, not only 
to those with doubtful claims to asylum, but also to gen-
uine refugees. Such policies therefore need to be accom-
panied by a comprehensive resettlement programme, 
and that requires an agreement on burden-sharing.  
Resettlement programmes have existed for decades. 
Developed countries set quotas and refugees, whose 
claims to refugee status have been verified in advance 
by agencies such as the UNHCR, are transferred direct-
ly from camps in countries of first asylum, thus avoid-
ing the vagaries of unauthorised migration. But the total 
number of resettlements is only about 100,000 per an-
num – a pitifully small number; and most of these are 
admitted by the United States, Australia and Canada. In 
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2012 the EU launched a programme of resettlement, but 
as of 2014 the total number of places amounted to just 
10,000, of which one third were offered by Germany. 
Nevertheless the fact that 18 countries were willing to 
participate suggests that resettlement is firmly on the 
agenda. And while the extent of public support for re-
settlement is unclear, there is considerable support for 
EU-level decision-making on immigration and asy-
lum (Hatton 2016, Table 11). Indeed, resettlement pro-
grammes have the advantage that they directly target 
those with the most urgent and pressing claims for trans-
fer as refugees to the developed world. They also avoid 
the spectre of unauthorised migration with the concom-
itant exploitation, injury and death. For these reasons 
resettlement programmes are likely to receive greater 
public support. By avoiding the logistical challenges as-
sociated with spontaneous asylum seeking, they should 
also be easier for governments to agree upon. 
In May 2015 the European Commission proposed 
20,000 resettlement places over two years and in July 
resettlement places were pledged for 72,500 Syrians, 
allocated according to a distribution key. The deepen-
ing crisis also prompted a United Nations summit on 19 
September 2016. Participants were expected to commit 
to resettling ten percent of the world’s 16 million refu-
gees, but that resolution failed to emerge. And while the 
communique pledged cooperation on a “global compact 
on responsibility sharing for refugees” the details were 
left to be worked out at a further summit in 2018 (UN 
General Assembly 2016). That was followed the next 
day by a summit of world leaders at which commitments 
were made to increase financial support for refugees 
and to double the number of resettlement places offered 
by developed countries. Much, however, remains to be 
done and that can only be achieved by an authority with 
the legislative power to act as a social planner. Given 
that the refugee crisis has unfolded on Europe’s door-
step, the EU and its associated states are best placed to 
take the lead.  
Conclusion
There is strong case for burden-sharing in order to boost 
Europe’s humanitarian efforts and achieve a more equi-
table distribution of refugees. However, there are prac-
tical and political impediments to making progress un-
der the present system of spontaneous asylum seeking. 
A joint resettlement programme is more likely to meet 
with success, but there is a long way to go and the EU 
must take the lead. 
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